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Norvell: Consitutional Law: Defining the Boundaries of Protected Intimate

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF
PROTECTED INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
Louis Norvell*
Appellee, the Attorney General of Georgia, offered Appellant an
attorney position with the Georgia Department of Law.' Appellant
accepted this offer,2 but the Attorney General withdrew it after
learning that Appellant planned to participate in a self-described
"Jewish, lesbian-feminist, out-door wedding."4 Appellant sued the
Attorney General in a section 1983 action, alleging that he had violated
her right of intimate association.5 The district court found that Appellant
possessed a protectable interest in intimate association with her female
partner6 and applied a balancing test to her claim.7 The court found that
Appellant's interest was outweighed by the state's concerns about her
employment, and held that the Attorney General had not violated
Appellant's associational rights.8 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the
* To my wife, Carolyn.
1. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 1101.
4. Id. at 1100. The Attorney General offered several reasons for withdrawing the
employment offer. He asserted that retention of Appellant would imply tacit approval of her
"marriage" to another woman; that the employment would be perceived by the public as
condoning now criminal homosexual sodomy; that Appellant's conduct indicated bad judgment
as her actions constituted political conduct advocating legal acceptance of homosexual marriage
and sodomy; and that Appellant's actions may be disruptive to department activities such as
sodomy prosecutions and child deprivation cases involving homosexual couples. See Brief of
Appellee at 10-13, Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995) (No. 93-9345).
5. See Shahar, 114 .3d at 1101. Appellant also claimed that the Attorney General's
action violated her rights to equal protection, free exercise of religion, expressive association,
and substantive due process. See ia
6. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993). The district court
found that Appellant had a constitutionally protected interest in intimate association with her
female partner which had been burdened by the Attorney General's action. See id. at 864. The
district court, however, deemed that this interest was outweighed by the Attorney General's
legitimate employment interests. See id
7. See id.at 864 (court applied the balancing test set forth in Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (involving a public employee terminated for First Amendment
activity)).
8. See id. at 865. The court granted summary judgment for the Attorney General on all
of Appellant's constitutional claims. See id, at 866.
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and held that the district
court should have applied a strict scrutiny standard of review, rather
than a balancing test, to evaluate Appellant's intimate association
claim.' On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the district
court's finding of a protected relationship for the purpose of argument
and, applying the balancing test, HELD, that the Attorney General did
not violate Appellant's right to intimate association by withdrawing her
job offer based on Appellant's homosexual wedding.'0
The United States Constitution does not contain an express right of
association. However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments as protecting certain associations." The
Court initially recognized this right only in cases involving political
association." In recent years, however, the Court has recognized that
the scope of associational protection extends beyond political association
to certain family-based associations. 3 Specifically, the Court repeatedly
has held that a traditional marriage union is an association most
deserving of constitutional protection. 4 For example, in Zablocki v.
Redhail 5 the Court held that a person has a right to enter into a
marital association, based not on the First Amendment, 6but on the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive Due Process Clause.'

9. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 78 F3d 499
(11th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
10. See Shahar, 114 E3d at 1100.
11. See NAACP v. Alabama ex el. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces the freedom of speech.").
12. See id. at 462 (holding that the compelled disclosure of the NAACP membership list
constitutes a restraint on the protected right of association).
13. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTTUTOONAL LAW § 16.41, at
1118-19 (5th ed. 1995) (describing three separate aspects of the right of association: economic,
intimate, and expressive). The Court's protection of family and personal relationships, at first,
did not expressly mention a freedom of association but rather relied on the concept of liberty
in the Due Process Clause and the right of privacy. See id.; see also, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (holding that right of extended family to live together
protected by substantive due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (determining
that marriage protected as a fundamental liberty right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (holding that access to contraception by married couples protected by right to
privacy).
14. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (invalidating state miscegenation law as an
unconstitutional restraint on the right to marry).
15. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. See id. at 384.
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In Zablocki, a Wisconsin statute required state residents, who were
under court order or judgment to pay child support,17 to petition a court
for permission to marry."8 A court would grant a petition only if the
petitioning resident proved that his children were not, and were not
likely to become, public charges. 9 Appellee, an indigent Wisconsin
resident, was under court order to pay child support.O° He filed an
application for a marriage license with Appellant, the county clerk,"
who denied the application because he failed to obtain court permission.'
17. See id at 375. The statute concerned minor children who were not in the custody of
the petitioning parent. See id
18. See id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1973)). The statute provided in part:
(1) No Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is
under obligation to support by any court order or judgment, may marry in this state
or elsewhere, without the order of either the court of this state which granted such
judgment or support order, or the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county
of this state where such minor issue resides or where the marriage license
application is made.
Id. at 375-76 n.1 (quoting Wis. STAr. § 245.10(1) (1973)).
19. See id. at 375. The statute stated:
Upon the hearing, if said person submits such proof and makes a showing that such
children are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges, the
court shall grant such order, a copy of which shall be filed in any prior proceeding.., or divorce action of such person in this state affected thereby; otherwise
permission for a license shall be withheld until such proof is submitted and such
showing is made, but any court order withholding such permission is an appealable
order. Any hearing under this section may be waived by the court if the court is
satisfied from an examination of the court records in the case and the family
support records in the office of the clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said
person of his financial resources that the latter has complied with prior court orders
or judgments affecting his minor children, and also has shown that such children
are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges.
(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as stated
in sub. (1), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such marriage,
obtain permission of the court ...
(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state.... Any marriage
contracted without compliance with this section, where such compliance is
required, shall be void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.
Id. at 376-77 n.1 (citing Wis. STAT. § 245.10(1), (4) (5) (1973)).
20. See UL at 378.
21. See id. Appellee and the woman he desired to marry were expecting a child and
wished to be lawfully married before the child was born. See id. at 379.
22. See id. at 378. The Appellee had not requested court permission. See id. It was
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The Appellee sued in federal district court alleging that the statute
violated his constitutional right to marry by requiring him to obtain
judicial permission before it would grant him a marriage license.23 The
district court agreed with the Appellee and held that the statute was an
invalid infringement on his Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right
to marry2 On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court's ruling, holding that marriage was a constitutionally
protected fundamental right.26 The Court stated that "[m]arriage is one
of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and
survival."'2 7 Further, the Court noted that marriage was " 'the foundation of the family and of society,' "' and that the right " 'to marry,
establish a home and bring up children' " was a liberty right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.29 Additionally,
the Court implied that the Appellee had an intimate association right in
marriage, stating that marriage was a union, "intimate to the degree of
being... sacred,... an association that promotes a way of life."'
Because the statute interfered with this fundamental right, the Court

stipulated that, due to his failure to make child support payments and his arrearage for past

payments, any request for permission would have been denied. See id.
23. See id at 379. The Appellee asserted that the ability to marry was a substantive due
process right secured by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. See id The state, in defense of the statute, asserted that the statute provided an

opportunity to counsel the petitioner regarding the need for continued support payments and to
ensure that the welfare of the children was protected. See id. at 388-89.
24. See id. at 381.
25. See id. at 381-82.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 383 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))).
28. See id. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
29. See id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
30. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486). The Court in Griswold
stated:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and

intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not

commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.
Id. The Zablocki Court's protection of marriage was grounded largely on the concept of the
inherent privacy shield surrounding marriage which was derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See iL The Court also stated that the right to procreate was

specifically implicated by Wisconsin's criminal prohibition on fornication. Id. at 386. Because
Wisconsin criminalized sexual activities outside of marriage, the right to enter into a marriage
relationship was necessary to exercise the protected right of procreation. See id

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/8

4

Norvell: Consitutional Law: Defining the Boundaries of Protected Intimate
CASE COMMENT

applied a strict scrutiny analysis3 ' and held that the state's interest in
promoting the payment of child support was not sufficiently compelling
to serve that interest.32
and that the statute was not narrowly tailored
33
Therefore, the statute was unconstitutional.
Six years after Zablocki, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,.' the
Court expressly recognized that familial and quasi-familial relationships
were protected by a right of intimate association.35 In Roberts, the
national chapter of the Jaycees notified two local Jaycees chapters that
it planned to revoke their charters because they had admitted female
members in violation of the organization's male-only membership
policy.36 Members of both local chapters filed charges against the
national chapter with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights for
allegedly violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which prohibited
discrimination on the basis of sex. 37 Before the Department began
hearings, the national chapter filed suit in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Department from
enforcing the Act.38 The national chapter asserted that enforcement of
the Act would violate its male members' constitutional rights of free
speech and association.39 The court of appeals reversed the district
court's judgment against the members' and held that enforcement of
the Act would violate the members' rights of free association guaranteed
by the First Amendment. 4 '

31. See i. at 388. The Court stated, when a statute interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right, "sufficiently important" state interests and a means "closely tailored" to serve

those interests are necessary to sustain the statute. See id
32. See id.

33. See id. at 390-91.
34. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
35. See id. at 618-20. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (discussing the contours of intimate association).
36. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. The Jaycees, a national charitable and civic organization,
maintained a membership policy which excluded women from regular membership. See id. at
613. The Jaycees limited regular membership to men aged 18 to 35. See U Associate
membership status was available to women and older men. See id Associate members paid
reduced membership dues but could not vote, hold local or national office, or participate in
certain leadership training and award programs. See id.

37. Id. at 614. The Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982)
provided in part:" 'It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a
place of public accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin
or sex.' " Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.
38. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615.

39. See id.
40. See id. at 616.
41. See id. at 616-17.
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On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
right of association encompassed two distinct categories: expressive
association based on the First Amendment42 and intimate association
based on the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive Due Process
Clause.43 Under the former category, the Constitution protected political
or public interest associations.' Under the latter category, the Constitution protected certain intimate relationships such as those within a
family."' The Court explained that a family relationship exemplifies
those intimate associations deserving of protection,' and used the
family as a reference to suggest limitations on the scope of protectable
interests.47 A relationship protected as an intimate associational right
would have to be similar to a family in its "relative smallness, [a] high
degree of selectivity... and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship."4
The Court refrained from defining any precise boundaries of
protected intimate associations.49 The Court indicated that to evaluate
the extent of protection that a relationship deserved, it was necessary to
consider the aspects of the relationship, including "size, purpose,

42. See id. at 617-18.
43. See id. at 618. The Court held that certain intimate relationships necessarily receive
protection as an essential element in personal liberty. See id. In extending the scope of protection
formerly recognized in marriage and other close family relationships, the Court's recognition of
a right to intimate association merged with the Court's prior protections under the right to
privacy. See id at 617-19; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 16.41, at 1119-20.
44. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
45. See id. at 617-19.
46. See id. at 619; see also Karst, supra note 35, at 629 (defining intimate association as
"a close and familiar personal relationship with another that is in some significant way
comparable to a marriage or family relationship").
47. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383-86 (marriage); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (childbirth); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (raising and education of children); and Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion) (co-habitation with
relatives)).
48. See id. at 620.
49. See id. at 618, 620. The Court stated that there was "a broad range of human
relationships that may make greater or lesser claims to constitutional protection." See id. at 620
(emphasis added). The Court specifically expressed that it was not marking those points "with
any precision." See id. Justice O'Connor's concurrence noted the associational interests in
"marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education ...
'while defying categorical description' " were protected from state interference. See id. at 631
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)); see also Neal E.
Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 901, 904 (1985) (stating that the
Court's recognition of a protected intimate association in Roberts may be as "narrow as the
family and as broad as anything more private than the Jaycees").
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policies, selectivity, [and] congeniality."' Applying this family-based
standard, the Court found that the Jaycees were too large and inclusive
to possess an intimate association right 1 Therefore, the Court reversed
the appellate court's decision, thereby allowing Minnesota to require that
females be admitted to the local chapters. 2
Two years after Roberts, the Court considered whether the right of
intimate association encompassed homosexual sexual relationships. In
Bowers v. Hardwick,53 the respondent was charged with violating
Georgia's criminal sodomy law' after committing sodomy with another
male in his home." Although the state prosecutor did not seek an
indictment,56 the respondent sued the state alleging that the law
violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.57
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
dismissal of the respondent's claim. The Eleventh Circuit stated that
protected intimate associations were not limited to those involving
marriage or procreation.59 The court found that the "sexual activity in
question here serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage."'
It also determined that the respondent's homosexual relationship "l[aid]
at the heart of an intimate association."61 The Eleventh Circuit noted

50. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
51. See id. at 620-21.
52. See id. at 621. The Court did recognize that the Jaycee's expressive association
interests were burdened by the Minnesota Act. See iL at 623. The Court applied a strict scrutiny
analysis and determined that Minnesota's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination

justified the burden on the Jaycee members' right of expressive association. See id.
53. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a critical discussion of the majority opinion in Hardwick,
see LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 55-60, 117

(1991).
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) provided that:

(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.
Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985), revd sub nor., 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
55. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.

56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id at 189.
59. See Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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the protected marriage association as recognized by Zablocki,62 and
found that the respondent's conduct resembled the intimate association
of marriage.' In sum, the court found that the state statute had
burdened the respondent's right of association, and remanded the case
instructing the district court to apply a strict scrutiny standard of
reviewP'4
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
remand,' rejecting the lower court's reasoning that homosexual
sodomy was protected as an intimate association.' The majority neither
found the respondent's interest to be similar to that in Zablocki nor
evaluated the respondent's association utilizing the family-based factors
articulated in Roberts.67 Rather, the Hardwick Court limited its discussion to whether the respondent had a fundamental right to commit
homosexual sodomy.6" The Court stated that the lower court misconstrued the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.69
The Court explained that the substantive Due Process Clause protected
relationships involving family, marriage, and procreation." Moreover,
the Court found "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or
'
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other."71
The Hardwick Court then explained the criteria necessary for an
interest to receive protection as a fundamental right.72 According to the
Court, rights deserving heightened protection included those liberties
which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."73 The

62. See id.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id.
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189.
See id. at 187.
See id. at 190-91.
See id. at 190.
See id.
See id. at 191.
See id.

71. Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, the Court explained:
No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of
Appeals or by respondent. Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless stand
for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.
Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
These rights also "include[d] those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "See
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Court explained that homosexual conduct was not deeply rooted in this
nation's history and, in fact, had been proscribed by societies since
ancient times.74 The majority noted that protecting homosexual conduct
would open the door to attacks on other traditionally prohibited activity
such as adultery, incest and other sexual crimes.75 The Court asserted
' Finding no fundamenthat it was "unwilling to start down that road."76
tal right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the Court applied a rational
basis standard of review and upheld the Georgia law.
The instant court did not follow the Hardwick approach to
Appellant's claim that her relationship was a protected association.
Although stating that "considerable doubt exists that Plaintiff has a
constitutionally protected federal right to be 'married' to another
woman,"7 " the instant court assumed for analytical purposes that the
district court correctly had identified a protected association.79 The
district court had applied the Roberts factors" and determined that
Appellant's relationship was a protected intimate association. Rather
than assuming a protected interest in association, however, the instant
court should have concluded, as did Judge Tjofiat in his concurring
opinion, that Appellant's relationship did not merit constitutional
protection. 2
The district court's reliance on the Roberts factors, and therefore, the
instant court's assumption, are misplaced. The district court determined
that Appellant's relationship was a close, personal relationship and,
therefore, worthy of protection. 3 Roberts, however, did not hold that
all relationships rise to the level of constitutional protection. Rather, the
Roberts Court explained that a family relationship both exemplified, and

id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).

74.
75.
76.
77.

See hi.
See id. at 195-96.
Id. at 196.
See id.

78. Shahar, 114 .3d at 1099.
79. See id. at 1100. The court stated that the existence of a protected association would

not change the outcome of the court's decision. See id.
80. See Shahar,836 E Supp. at 862. These factors included "relative smallness, a high
degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others

in critical aspect of the relationship." See it (quoting Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 601, 618
(1984)).
81. See i. at 863. The district court stated that Shahar's "wedding" ceremony signified
that her relationship was "a lifetime commitment which cannot end unless formally dissolved

within her religion." See id.
82. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1113 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
83. See Shahar,836 F. Supp. at 863.
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marked limitations to, protected intimate associations. 4 The Roberts
Court's imprecise language suggests consideration of extended family
arrangements,85 not the embracement of alternative lifestyles.
Merely establishing a close, personal relationship is not sufficient to
warrant constitutional protection. The Court expressly has stated that the
Constitution does not recognize a "generalized right of 'social association.' 86 The Constitution requires much more. The Court has noted
that "traditional personal bonds," protected as an intimate association,
must have " 'played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the
Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.' "87
Unlike those protected relationships, Appellant's same-sex relationship
lacks a foundation either in tradition or society.88 On this point, Justice
Harlan wrote: "[L]aws forbidding.., homosexual practices ... form
a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis." 89 The
Hardwick Court also noted that laws prohibiting' homosexual conduct'
are firmly established and have "ancient roots."'
In comparison, Zablocki involved a traditional marriage relationship
which the Supreme Court recognized as " 'the most important relation
in life,' "92 and " 'the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.' %93 The
Zablocki Court recognized the sanctity of traditional marriage as being
older than our Nation and older than the Bill of Rights.94 As Judge

84. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. According to the Roberts Court, constitutional protection
has been provided for the "personal bonds [which] have played a critical role in the culture and
traditions of the Nation." See id, at 618-19.
85. See id at 619-20 (For example, the Court makes repeated reference to Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1977) (protecting the right of a grandmother to live
with her two grandsons who were unrelated by blood).).
86. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
87. See FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-

19).
88. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
89. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. The instant court concluded that the Attorney General's action was based on
Appellant's conduct, not status. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at I110; see also id, at 1111 (Tjoflat, J.,
specially concurring). For the Supreme Court's latest discussion on homosexual status, see
generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
91. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192.
92. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
93. See id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). Justice Powell's
concurrence in Zablocki is also particularly noteworthy. Powell listed incest, bigamy, and
homosexuality as relationships which were permissibly subject to state prohibition. See id. at 399
(Powell, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 384 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
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Tjoflat noted in his concurrence: "Homosexual relationships have not
played the same role as marital or familial relationships in the history
and traditions of the Nation."'95 Moreover, the Hardwick Court specifically found "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation... and homosexual activity."' Consequently, Appellant's samesex relationship should not be accorded the special constitutional status
as traditional family-based relations.
Hardwick should have disposed of Appellant's claim, not simply
because Hardwickapproved criminal sanctions for homosexual sodomy,
but because Hardwick rejected an intimate association argument
analogous to that raised by Appellant. In Hardwick, the lower court
found that the respondent's conduct was protected as an intimate
association.97 The Eleventh Circuit focused not on the physical act, but
on the private and intimate nature of the association.98 The court found
a "resemblance between Hardwick's conduct and the intimate association of marriage."" The court claimed that the plaintiff's physical act
"serve[d] the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage ' "' and that the
activity occurred in the private sanctuary of the home."' The court
concluded that the plaintiff's activity was "quintessentially private and
l[aid] at the heart of an intimate association."'" The Supreme Court,
however, has rejected these arguments." 3 The Hardwick Court insisted
that rights entitled to heightened judicial protection must be restricted
to those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'' " and those
" 'deeply rooted in this Nation's liberty and tradition.' "105 The
Hardwick plaintiff's homosexual relationship failed those tests in
Hardwick as Appellant's relationship fails the tests today.
The Hardwick Court warned that the "Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design
of the Constitution."'' 6 In light of this warning, the Shahar court
should have rejected Appellant's claim outright. The Supreme Court's

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1115 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
See id. at 1211-12.
See id. at 1212.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
See id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 325, 326 (1937)).
See id. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (opinion of Powell, J.)).

106. See id. at 194.
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pronouncements on intimate association indicate that the Court has taken
a restrictive approach to claims for protected relationships. Consequently, courts should refrain from treating non-traditional relationships as
protected associations, and should defer to democratic resolution of
these innovative claims.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/8

12

